Abstract-Despite the clear need for specifying and enforcing information flow policies, existing tools and theories either fall short of practical languages, fail to encompass the declassification needed for practical requirements, or fail to provide provable guarantees. In this paper we make progress on provable guarantees encompassing declassification by leveraging type abstraction. We translate information flow policies, with declassification, into an interface for which an unmodified standard typechecker can be applied to a source program-if it typechecks, the program provably satisfies the policy. Our proof reduces security to the mathematical foundation of data abstraction, Reynolds' abstraction theorem. By proving this result for a large fragment of pure ML, we give evidence for the potential to build sound security tools using off the shelf language tools and their theories.
I. INTRODUCTION
A longstanding challenge is the enforcement of information flow (IF) policy in software systems and applications implemented in conventional general-purpose programming languages. For high assurance, precise mathematical definitions are needed for policies, enforcement mechanism, and program semantics. The latter, in particular, is a major challenge for languages in practical use. In order to minimize the cost of assurance, especially over time as systems evolve, it is desirable to leverage work on formal modeling with other goals such as functional verification, equivalence checking, and compilation.
To be auditable by stakeholders, policy should be expressed in an accessible way. This is one of several reasons why types play an important role in many works on IF. For example, Flowcaml [1] and Jif [2] express policy using types that include IF labels. They statically enforce policy using dedicated IF type checking and inference. Techniques from type theory are also used in security proofs such as those for Flowcaml and the calculus DCC [3] .
IF is typically formalized as the preservation of indistinguishability relations between executions. Researchers have noticed that this should be an instance of a celebrated semantics basis in type theory: relational parametricity [4] . Relational parametricity provides an effective basis for formal reasoning about program transformations [5] , representation independence and information hiding for program verification [6] , [7] . The connection between IF and relation parametricity has recently been made precise, for DCC, by translation to the calculus F ω and use of the existing parametricity theorem for F ω [8] .
In this work, we advance the state of the art in the connection between IF and relational parametricity, guided by three main goals. One of the goals motivating our work is to reduce the burden of defining dedicated type checking, inference, and security proofs for high assurance in programming languages. A promising approach towards this goal is the idea of leveraging type abstraction to enforce policy, and in particular, leveraging the parametricity theorem in programming languages to obtain security guarantees. A concomitant goal is to do so for practical policies that encompass selective downgrading, which is needed for the vast majority of policies of practical interest. Without downgrading, a password checker program or a program that calculates aggregate or statistical information must be considered insecure, for example.
To build on the type system and formal theory of a language without a priori IF features, policy needs to be encoded somehow, and the program may need to be transformed. For example, to prove that a typechecked DCC term is secure with respect to the policy expressed by its type, Bowman and Ahmed [8] encode the typechecking judgment by nontrivial translation of both types and terms into types and terms of F ω . Any translation becomes part of the assurance argument. Most likely, complicated translation will also make it more difficult to use extant type checking/inference (and other development tools) in diagnosing security errors and developing secure code. This leads us to highlight a third goal, needed to achieve the first goal, namely to minimize the complexity of translation.
There is a major impediment to leveraging type abstraction: few languages are relationally parametric or have parametricity theorems! The lack of parametricity can be addressed by focusing on well behaved subsets and leveraging additional features like ownership types that may be available for other purposes (e.g., in the Rust language). As for the paucity of parametricity theorems, we take hope in the recent advances in machine-checked metatheory, such as correctness of the CakeML and CompCert compilers, the VST logic for C, the relational logic of Iris. For parametricity specifically, the most relevant work is Crary's formal proof of parametricity for the ML module calculus [9] . Our main result is a reduction of IF to parametricity in that calculus.
Before elaborating on our contributions let us review some prior work. The calculus DCC expresses policy using monad types indexed on levels in a lattice of security levels with the usual interpretation that flows are only allowed between levels in accord with the ordering. While DCC is a theoretical calculus, its monadic types fit nicely with the monads and monad transformers used by the Haskell language for computational effects like state and I/O. Algehed and Russo encode the typing judgment of DCC in Haskell using closed type families, one of the type system extensions supported by GHC [10] . However, they do not prove security; and DCC expresses strict noninterference, with no form of downgrading.
Bowman and Ahmed translate DCC to F ω and prove the security theorem of DCC as a consequence of parametricity of F ω [8] . (The original security proof for DCC does not leverage parametricity [3] .) DCC relies on a subsidiary judgment about types, called "protected-at", and the cited works rely on the power of a highly expressive target calculus to encode this judgment. As we discuss in the related work section II, prior attempts to formalize security of DCC using parametricity in less powerful target calculi encountered difficulties in connection with the "protected-at" judgment. Most information flow type systems address practical policies in which the sensitive data is first order; they express and check security more simply than DCC. Our goals do not at all necessitate a system like DCC for policy.
Cruz et al [11] consider policies in which downgrading is expressed in terms of allowed declassifier programs, encoding the "relaxed noninterference" idea of Li and Zdancewic [12] using type abstraction in the object calculus. The formulation of policy in terms of allowed operations is attractive and seems adaptable to practical languages. The idea is close to the use of an explicit "declass" operation as in Jif and other works, while keeping policy distinct from program rather than embedded in it. Although the object calculus enjoys a parametricity theorem [13] , the security proof of Cruz et al is done from scratch. Moreover they make a significant modification to the type system, introducing faceted types in order to express sensitivity from the perspective of observers at different levels. This makes good use of subtyping, already present in the object calculus, but is a concern with respect to our goals of leveraging existing tools and theorems.
Our first contribution is to translate policies with declassification (in the style of relaxed interference) into abstract types in a functional language, in such a way that typechecking the original program implies its security. We consider variations in which a thin wrapper is used, but we do not rely on on a specialized security type system like DCC. A program that typechecks may use the secret inputs parametrically, e.g., storing in data structures, but cannot look at the data until declassification has been applied. Our second contribution is to prove security by direct application of a parametricity theorem. We carry out this development twice: for polymorphic lambda calculus, using the original theorem of Reynolds, and for the ML module calculus using Crary's theorem. The second handles a large fragment of a real language while the first serves to expose the ideas. The technical details for ML are far too complicated to present in a conference paper, but complete details are presented in appendices.
The ML result makes a strong connection with a large fragment of a "real" language, however, we fall short of our practical goals because our development does not account for programs with high (or multiple level) computation and output. Although this is needed in general, there are many important programs where this does not matter such as data mining computations using sensitive inputs to calculate aggregate or statistical information, and many mobile apps. To solve this problem we could follow Cruz et al and introduce a notion of faceted types for ML, but this would undercut the goal of leveraging existing tools. Instead we offer our third contribution, which is simply to pose this open problem: encode relaxed policies using type abstraction, encompassing multiple level computation and outputs while leveraging an existing parametricity theorem-or demonstrate that it cannot be done. For practical relevance, the encoding should target a language like ML with efficient type checking.
Outline: Section II describes related work and Section III introduces security policies for relaxed noninterference. Section IV recapitulates the abstraction theorem in the context of the simply typed and call-by-value lambda calculus, close to that of Reynolds [4] , so we can expose the main ideas in a simple setting. Section V presents our first result: typebased encoding of policy, and proof of relaxed noninterference for this calculus by means of the abstraction theorem. Section VI discusses extensions of the first result for more expressive policies and more permissive checking. 1 Although many variations and extensions are possible, in this article we devote the available space to working out the chosen versions in detail. Section VII describes our result that uses the calculus and abstraction theorem of Crary [9] , which formalizes the functional core of standard ML and its module system. It supports unrestricted recursion at the term level, generative and applicative functors, higher-order functors, sealing, and translucent signatures. For this calculus we have carried out a development parallel to that in Section V, which can be found in full detail in appendices. In Section VII we sketch the ideas using SML code. Section VIII concludes by highlighting limitations of our encodings and challenges for future work.
All results not proved in the paper are proved in appendices.
II. RELATED WORK
We focus on the closest related work regarding noninterference, declassification, and connections to the abstraction theorem. We refer the interested reader to [14] for the early history of language-based information flow security, and to [15] for a survey on declassification up to 2009. a) Typing secure information flow: Pottier and Simonet [16] implement FlowCaml [1] , the first type system for information flow analysis dealing with a real-sized programming language (a large fragment of OCaml), and they prove soundness. In comparison with our results, we do not consider any imperative features; they do not consider any form of declassification, their type system significantly departs from standard ML typing rules, and their security proof is not based on an abstraction theorem. An interesting question is whether their type system can be translated to system F or some other calculus with an abstraction theorem. FlowCaml provides type inference for security types. In this work, we rely on the standard ML type system to enforce security. Standard ML provides type inference, which endows our approach with an inference mechanism. Our work has a significant limitation compared with FlowCaml and other systems: as noted in Section I, our encoding does not allow computation that produces both secret and public outputs.
Barthe et al. [17] propose a modular method to reuse type systems and proofs for noninterference for declassification. They also provide a method to conclude declassification soundness by using an existing theorem. In contrast to our work, their type system significantly departs from standard typing rules, and does not make use of abstraction.
Tse and Zdancewic [18] propose a security-typed language for robust declassification: declassification cannot be triggered unless there is a digital certificate to assert the proper authority. Their language inherits many features from System F <: and uses monadic labels as in DCC [3] . In contrast to our work, security labels are based on the Decentralized Label Model (DLM) [19] , and are not semantically unified with the standard safety types of the language.
Compared with type systems, relational logics can specify IF policy and prove more programs secure through semantic reasoning [20] - [23] , but at the cost of more user guidance and less familiar notations. b) Relaxed Noninterference: As discussed in the introduction, our policies and security property are based on the work of Li and Zdancewic [12] , which proposes two kinds of declassification policies: local and global policies. Our approach supports both of them. Their source programs are written in a pure lambda calculus with recursion, like the language we consider in Sections IV and V except that we do not include recursion until Section C. Sabelfeld and Sands [15] evaluate the formalization of [12] with respect to guiding principles for declassification.
c) Connections between secure information flow and type abstraction: The Dependency Core Calculus (DCC) [3] expresses security policies using monadic types. It does not include declassification, and the noninterference theorem of [3] is proved from scratch. Tse and Zdancewic [24] translate the recursion-free fragment of DCC to System F. The main theorem for this translation aims to show that parametricity of System F implies noninterference. Shikuma and Igarashi identify a mistake in the proof [25] ; they also give a noninterferencepreserving translation for a version of DCC to the simplytyped lambda calculus. Although they make direct use of a specific logical relation, their results are not obtained by instantiating a general parametricity theorem. Bowman and Ahmed [8] finally provide a translation from the recursionfree fragment of DCC to System F ω , successfully proving that parametricity implies noninterference, via a correctness theorem for the translation (which is akin to a full abstraction property). Bowman and Ahmed's translation makes essential use of the power of System F ω to encode judgments of DCC, raising the question whether a simpler target type system can suffice for security policies expressed differently from DCC.
These works are "translating noninterference to parametricity" in the sense of translating both programs and types. The practical implication is that one might leverage an existing type checker by translating both a program and its security policy into another program such that it's typability implies the original conforms to policy. Our work aims to cater more directly for practical application, by avoiding (or minimizing) the need to translate the program and hence avoiding the need to prove the correctness of a translation. This approach seems to have limitations-in particular, concerning computation that produces both public and secret outputs-which we pose as an open problem. Of course in a sufficiently powerful type system, one can express the security property semantically. But then typechecking is undecidable and the translation does not serve our goals.
Cruz et al. [11] show that type abstraction implies relaxed noninterference. Similar to ours, their definition of relaxed noninterference is a standard extensional semantics, using partial equivalence relations. This is in contrast with [12] where the semantics is entangled with typability. They allow computation on secrets and require that the result of such computation cannot be released. In contrast to our work, their results are in the context of the object calculus [13] where they use subtyping to guide the security levels order. They do not attempt to use the abstraction theorem of the object calculus to conclude soundness. We conjecture that our approach can also be applied in the context of the object calculus for relaxed noninterference as defined in [11] . We leave this as future work.
Protzenko et al. [26] propose to use abstract types as the types for secrets and use standard type systems for security. This is very close in spirit to our work. Their soundness theorem is about a property called "secret independence", very close to noninterference. In contrast to our work, there are no results for any kind of declassification and no attempt to use the abstraction theorem.
Rajani and Garg [27] connect fine-and coarse-grained type systems for information flow in a lambda calculus with general references, defining noninterference (without declassification) as a step-indexed Kripke logical relation that expresses indistinguishability. Further afield, a connection between security and parametricity is made by Devriese et al [28] , featuring a negative result: System F cannot be compiled to the the SumiiPierce calculus of dynamic sealing [29] (an idealized model of a cryptographic mechanism). Finally, information flow analyses have also been put at the service of parametricity: Washburn and Weirich [30] generalize parametricity in the presence of runtime type analysis using security labels for data structures that should remain confidential in order to hide implementation details .
d) Abstraction theorems for other languages: Vytiniotis and Weirich [31] prove the abstraction theorem for R ω , which extends F ω with constructs that are useful for programming with type equivalence propositions. Rossberg et al [32] show another path to parametricity for ML modules, by translating them to another calculus, System F ω . Crary's result [9] covers a large fragment of ML but not references and mutable state. Banerjee and Naumann [7] prove an abstraction theorem for a sequential Java-like language, using a form of ownership types to enforce abstraction for dynamically allocated mutable objects, and in later work they prove similar results using program annotations to enforce abstraction [33] , [34] . (Around the same time, they proved noninterference for a security type system for a similar language, but from scratch rather than via an abstraction theorem [35] , [36] .) Ahmed et al. [37] develop a step-indexed logical relation for a language with references. Based on that work, Dreyer et al. [38] formulate a relational modal logic for proving contextual equivalence for the LADR language that has general recursive types and general ML-style references atop System F. Timany et al [39] give a logical relation for a state monad and use it to prove contextual equivalences. These works are important steps towards the development of abstraction theorems for rich fragments of practical languages.
III. DECLASSIFICATION: LOCAL POLICIES
The main idea in relaxed noninterference security policies is to specify for each confidential input how it can be released [12] . Inspired by this idea, our security policies, called local policies, map confidential inputs to a declassification function f , or a combination of an action a and a declassification function f (see §VI for a generalization). When a confidential input x can be declassified via the combination of an action a and a function f , then the result of f (a x) is allowed to be made visible to a public observer. In other words, the confidential input can be declassified via f • a, where (f • a)(x) = f (a x). The result of a x is not visible to the observer, only f (a x) is. The input can be manipulated parametrically until a is applied, and then the result of a x can be manipulated parametrically until f is applied. Thus the policy is applied to the original input, as usually advised to avoid laundering attacks [15] .
The syntax for writing declassification functions and actions is as below, 2 where n is an integer value, and ⊕ represents primitive arithmetic operators.
Types e ::= λx : τ.e | e e | x | n | e ⊕ e Terms a, b ::= λx : int.e Actions f, g ::= λx : int.e
Declass. Functions
The static semantics and the dynamic semantics for the policy language are standard and similar to the ones of the simply typed and call-by-value lambda calculus with type variables (see § IV). For primitive operators, to simplify the presentation, we suppose that the applications of operators on well-typed arguments always terminates. Therefore, the evaluations of declassification functions and combinations on values always terminate.
For policies we refrain from using concrete syntax and instead give a simple formalization that facilitates later definitions.
Definition III.1 (Local Policy). A local policy P is a tuple V P , F P , where V P is a finite set of variables for confidential inputs, and F P is a partial mapping from variables in V P to declassification functions or combinations.
For simplicity we require that if a or f appears in the policy then they are closed terms, a is of the type int → int, and f has type int → τ f for some τ f .
In the definition of local policies, if a confidential input is not associated with a declassification function or a combination, then it cannot be declassified. Formally, a combination is mathematically defined as a pair f, a but we write it as f • a for clarity.
Example III.2 (Policy P OE using f ). Consider policy P OE given by V POE , F POE where V POE = {x} and F POE (x) = f = λx : int.x mod 2. Policy P OE states that only the parity of the confidential input x can be released to a public observer.
Assume that hash is a primitive operator. Consider policy P H given by V PH , F PH where V PH = {x}, F PH (x) = f • a, a is λx : int.hash x, and f is λx : int.x mod 2 64 . Policy P H states that the hashed value of the confidential input x cannot be released, but the lowest 64 bits of its hashed value can.
The notion of action can be generalized to multiple steps of declassification, for example to specify the correct order of application of sanitizers [40] . Our encoding can be extended straightforwardly to multiple steps, at the cost of notational clutter we prefer to avoid in this presentation.
IV. ABSTRACTION THEOREM
For source programs we choose the simply typed and callby-value lambda calculus, with integers and type variables, because of two reasons: (1) the chosen language is similar to the language used in the paper of Reynolds [4] where the abstraction theorem was first proven, and (2) we want to illustrate our encoding approach ( §V) in a minimal calculus. This section defines the syntax and semantics and presents key results that culminate in the abstraction theorem, a.k.a. parametricity. These results are basically standard. In fact our language is very close to the one in Reynolds [4, § 2] , for which we prove the abstraction theorem using contemporary notation 3 .
A. Language
The syntax of the language is as below, where α denotes a type variable, x a term variable, and n an integer value. A value is closed when there is no free term variable in it. A type is closed when there is no type variable in it.
Values e ::= x | v | e, e | π i e | e 1 e 2 Terms E ::
We consider terms without type variables as source programs (the role of type variables is to encode policies, as explained in due course). We use small-step semantics, with the reduction relation defined inductively by these rules.
We write e[x → e ′ ] for capture-avoiding substitution of e ′ for free occurrences of x in e. Here and throughout, we use parentheses to disambiguate term structure. As usual, * denotes the reflexive, transitive closure of . a) Typing rules: A typing context ∆ is a set of type variables. A term context Γ is a mapping from term variables to types.
We write ∆ ⊢ τ to mean that τ is well-formed w.r.t. ∆. The definition of ∆ ⊢ τ is described below. The definition is standard and it amounts to the requirement that type variables in τ are in ∆. We say that e is typable w.r.t. ∆ and Γ (denoted by ∆, Γ ⊢ e) when there exists a well-formed type τ s.t. ∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ .
The derivable typing judgments are defined inductively in Fig. 1 . The rules are to be instantiated only with Γ that is well-formed under ∆, in the sense that ∆ ⊢ Γ(x) for all x ∈ dom(Γ). When the term context and the type context are empty, we write ⊢ e : τ .
B. Logical relation
A logical relation is a type-indexed family of relations on values, based on given relations for type variables. From it is derived a relation on terms. The abstraction theorem says the latter is reflexive. Let γ be a term substitution, i.e., a finite map from term variables to closed values, and δ be a type substitution, i.e., a finite map from type variables to closed types. In symbols:
We say γ respects Γ (denoted by γ |= Γ) when dom(γ) = dom(Γ) and ⊢ γ(x) : Γ(x) for any x. We say δ respects ∆ (denoted by δ |= ∆) when dom(δ) = ∆. Let Rel(τ 1 , τ 2 ) be the set of all binary relations over closed values of closed types τ 1 and τ 2 . Let ρ be an environment, a mapping from type variables to relations R ∈ Rel(τ 1 , τ 2 ). We write ρ ∈ Rel(δ 1 , δ 2 ) to say that ρ is compatible with δ 1 , δ 2 as follows:
The logical relation is inductively defined in Fig. 2 , where ρ ∈ Rel(δ 1 , δ 2 ) for some
ρ is a relation on terms. Lemma IV.1. Suppose that ρ ∈ Rel(δ 1 , δ 2 ) for some δ 1 and δ 2 . For i ∈ {1, 2}, it follows that:
We write δ(Γ) to mean a term substitution obtained from Γ by applying δ on the range of Γ, i.e.:
Suppose that ∆, Γ ⊢ e : τ , δ |= ∆, and γ |= δ(Γ). Then we write δγ(e) to mean the application of δ and γ to e. For example, suppose that δ(α) = int, γ(x) = n for some n, and α, x : α ⊢ λy : α.x : α → α, then δγ(λy : α.x) = λy : int.n. We write
Definition IV.2 (Logical equivalence). Terms e and e ′ are logically equivalent at τ in ∆ and Γ (written ∆, Γ ⊢ e ∼ e ′ : τ )
τ , and for all δ 1 , δ 2 |= ∆, all ρ ∈ Rel(δ 1 , δ 2 ), and all
V. TYPE-BASED RELAXED NONINTERFERENCE
In this section, we show how to encode security policies as standard types in the language of § IV, we define and we prove our first free theorem. The security property is called typed-based relaxed noninterference (TRNI) and is taken from Cruz et al [11] .
Through this section, we consider a fixed policy P (see Def. III.1) given by V P , F P . We treat free variables in a program as inputs and, without loss of generality, we assume that there are two kinds of inputs: integer values, which are considered as confidential, and declassification functions and actions, which are fixed according to policy. A public input can be encoded as a confidential input that can be declassified via the identity function.
A. Views and indistinguishability
In order to define TRNI we define two term contexts, called the confidential view and public view. The first view represents an observer that can access to all confidential inputs, while the second one represents an observer that can only observe declassified inputs. The views are defined using fresh term and type variables. a) Confidential view: Let V ⊤ = {x | x ∈ V P \ dom(F P )} be the set of inputs that cannot be declassified. First we define the encoding for these inputs as a term context:
Next, we specify the encoding of confidential inputs that can be declassified. To this end, define , C as follows, where a : int → int and f : int → τ f are in P.
Finally, we write Γ P C for the term context encoding the confidential view for P.
We assume that, for any x, the variables x f and x a in the result of x, F P (x) C are distinct from the variables in V P , distinct from each other, and distinct from x f ′ and x a ′ for distinct f ′ , a ′ . We also make this assumption in the definition of the public view, to follow.
From the construction, Γ P C is a mapping, and for any x ∈ dom(Γ P C ), it follows that Γ P C (x) is a closed type. Therefore, Γ P C is well-formed for the empty set of type variables, so it can be used in typing judgments of the form Γ P C ⊢ e : τ . Example V.1 (Confidential view). For P OE described in Example III.2, the confidential view is:
The basic idea is to encode local policies by using type variables. First we define the encoding for confidential inputs that cannot be declassified. We define a set of type variables, ∆ P P,⊤ and a mapping Γ P P,⊤ for confidential inputs that cannot be declassified.
This serves to give the program access to x at an opaque type. In order to define the encoding for confidential inputs that can be declassified, we define , P :
The first form will serve to give the program access to x only via function variable x f that we will ensure is interpreted as the policy function f ; similarly for the second form. We define a type context ∆ P P and term context Γ P P that comprise the public view, as follows.
Example V.2 (Public view). For P OE , the typing context in the public view has only one type variable:
For P H , the typing context in the public view has two type variables:
From the construction, Γ P P is a mapping, and for any x ∈ dom(Γ P P ), it follows that Γ P P (x) is well-formed in ∆ P P (i.e. ∆ P P ⊢ Γ P P (x)). Thus, Γ P P is well-formed in the typing context ∆ P P . Therefore, ∆ P P and Γ P P can be used in typing judgments of the form ∆ P P , Γ P P ⊢ e : τ . Notice that in the public view of a policy, types of variables for confidential inputs are not int. Thus, the public view does not allow programs where concrete declassifiers are applied to confidential input variables even when the applications are correct according to the policy (e.g. for P OE , the program f x does not typecheck in the public view). However, the public view does allow programs where confidential input variables are used in applications of declassifier variables associated with them (e.g. for P OE , the program x f x is well-typed in the public view).
c) Indistinguishability: The security property TRNI is defined in a usual way, using partial equivalence relations called indistinguishability. To define indistinguishability, we define a type substitution δ P such that δ P |= ∆ P P , as follows:
The inductive definition of indistinguishability for a policy P is presented in Figure 3 , where α x , α f , and α f •a are from ∆ P P . Indistinguishability is defined for τ s.t.
The definitions of indistinguishability for int and τ 1 × τ 2 are straightforward. We say that two functions are indistinguishable at τ 1 → τ 2 if on any indistinguishable inputs they generate indistinguishable outputs. Since we use α x to encode confidential integer values that cannot be declassified, any integer values v 1 and v 2 are indistinguishable, according to rule Eq-Var1. Notice that δ P (α x ) = int. Since we use α f to encode confidential integer values that can be declassified via f where ⊢ f : int → τ f , we say that
We write e 1 = int e 2 to mean that e 1 * v and e 2 * v for some integer value v.
Indistinguishability is illustrated in Example V.3.
Example V.3 (Indistinguishability). For P OE (of Example III.2), two values v 1 and v 2 are indistinguishable at α f when both of them are even numbers or odd numbers.
For P H (of Example III.3), two values v 1 and v 2 are indistinguishable at α f •a when they are integer values and the lowest 64 bits of their hashed values are the same.
We say that two term substitutions γ 1 and γ 2 are indistinguishable w.r.t.
Note that each γ i maps x f and x a to the specific functions f and a in the policy. Input variables are mapped to indistinguishable values.
We now define type-based relaxed noninterference w.r.t. P for a type τ well-formed in ∆ P P . It says that indistinguishable inputs lead to indistinguishable results.
Definition V.4.
A term e is TRNI(P, τ ) provided that Γ P C ⊢ e, and ∆ P P ⊢ τ , and for all γ 1 , γ 2 
Notice that if a term is well-typed in the public view then by replacing all type variables in it with int, we get a term which is also well-typed in the confidential view (that is, if ∆ P P , Γ P P ⊢ e : τ , then Γ P C ⊢ δ(e) : δ(τ ) where δ maps all type variables in ∆ P P to int). However, Definition V.4 also requires that the term e is itself well-typed in the confidential view. This ensures that the definition is applied, as intended, to programs that do not contain type variables.
The definition of TRNI is indexed by a type for the result of the term. The type can be interpreted as constraining the observations to be made by the public observer. We are mainly interested in concrete output types, which express that the observer can do whatever they like and has full knowledge of the result. Put differently, TRNI for an abstract type expresses security under the assumption that the observer is somehow forced to respect the abstraction. For example, we consider the policy P OE (of Example III.2) where x can be declassified via f = λx : int.x mod 2. As described in Example V.2, ∆ POE P = α f and Γ POE P = x : α f , x f : α f → int. We have that the program x is TRNI(P OE , α f ) since the observer cannot do anything to x except for applying f to x which is allowed by the policy. This program, however, is not TRNI(P OE , int) since the observer can apply any function of the type int → τ ′ (for some closed τ ′ ), including the identity function, to x and hence can get the value of x.
Example V.5. The program x f x is TRNI(P OE , int). Indeed, for any arbitrary
where γ 1 (x) = v 1 and γ 2 (x) = v 2 for some v 1 and v 2 . When we apply γ 1 and γ 2 to the program, we get respectively v 1 mod 2 and v 2 mod 2.
. Therefore, the program x f x satisfies the definition of TRNI.
Remark V.6 (On definition of TRNI). The definition of TRNI(P, τ ) does not require that e is well-typed in the public view or the type of e in the public view is τ . Thus, we have cases where e is TRNI(P, τ ) and e is not well-typed in the public view or the type of e in the public view and τ are different. In fact, in such cases, the type of e in the confidential view and τ will be compatible in the sense that if we replace all type variables in τ with int, we get the type of e in the confidential view.
Here is an example of a program that is TRNI at int but it is not well-typed in the public view: e = (λx : int.xmod 2) x. We can easily verify that program e is TRNI(P OE , int). This program is not well-typed in the public view since in the public view, the type of x is not int. Notice that this example also shows that our type system is not complete, as it must be for reasons of decidability (see also Section VI-A.b).
We now give an example of a program that is TRNI at τ but its type in the public view is not τ . We consider a policy P
• where V P • = {x} and F P • (x) = f = λx : int.x (i.e. x can be declassified via the identity function). We have that x is TRNI(P • , int). Indeed, since f is the identity function, we have that
Thus, for any γ 1 and γ 2 s.t.
, but the type of x in the public view is α f .
B. Free theorem: typing in the public view implies security
In order to prove the free theorem, we define ρ P as follows:
It is a relation on the type substitution δ P defined in Eqn. (1).
Lemma V.7. ρ P ∈ Rel(δ P , δ P ). 
The main result of this section is that a term is TRNI at τ if it has type τ in the public view that encodes the policy.
Theorem V. 10 . If e has no type variables and ∆ P P , Γ P P ⊢ e : τ , then e is TRNI(P, τ ).
, and for all ρ ∈ Rel(δ 1 , δ 2 ), it follows that
ρP . Since e has no type variable, we have that δ P γ i (e) = γ i (e). Therefore,
In addition, since e has no type variable and ∆ P P , Γ P P ⊢ e : τ , we have that δ P (Γ P P ) ⊢ e : δ P (τ ) and hence, Γ P C ⊢ e. Therefore, e is TRNI(P, τ ).
Example V.11 (Typing implies TRNI). We consider the policy P OE . As described in Example V.1 and Example V.2, the confidential view Γ POE C is x : int, x f : int and the public view
We look at the program x f x. We can easily verify that Γ POE C ⊢ x f x : int and ∆ POE P , Γ POE P ⊢ x f x : int. Therefore, by Theorem V.10, the program is TRNI(P OE , int).
Similarly, we have that the program x f (x a x) is well-typed in both views of P H , and in the public view, its types is int. Thus, the program is TRNI(P H , int).
Example V.12. In this example, we illustrate that if a program is well-typed in the confidential view and is not TRNI(P, τ ) for some τ well-formed in the public view of P, then the type of the program in the public view is not τ or the program is not well-typed in the public view.
We consider the policy P OE . As described in Example V.11, its public view is α f , x : α f , x f : α f → int. We first look at the program x. This program is not TRNI(P OE , int) since x itself is confidential and cannot be directly declassified. In the public view of the policy, the type of this program is α f which is not int.
We now look at the program x mod 3. This program is not TRNI(P OE , α f ) since it takes indistinguishable inputs at α f (e.
. We can easily verify that this program is not well-typed in the public view since the type of x in the public view is α f , while mod expects arguments of the int type.
VI. EXTENSIONS

A. Local policies
Variations of our encoding can support richer policies and accept more secure programs. We consider two ways to extend our encoding.
a) More declassification functions or combinations: The notation in [12] labels an input with a set of declassification functions and combinations, so in general an input can be declassified in more than one way. To show how this can be accomodated, we present an extension for a policy P where V P = {x}, and x can be declassified via f • a or g • b for some f , a, g and b, where ⊢ f : int → τ f and ⊢ g : int → τ g . The confidential view and the public view for this policy are as below:
We now have a new definition of indistinguishability. The definition is similar to the one presented in §V, except that we add a new rule for α f •a,g•b .
EQ-VAR4
With the new encoding and the new definition of indistinguishability, we can define TRNI(P, τ ) as in Definition V.4. From the abstraction theorem, we again obtain that for any program e, if Γ P C ⊢ e, and ∆ P P , Γ P P ⊢ e : τ , then e is TRNI(P, τ ).
For example, we consider programs e 1 = x f (x a x) and e 2 = x g (x b x). These two programs are well-typed in both views of P, and in the public view, their types are respectively τ f and τ g . Thus, e 1 is TRNI(P, τ f ), and e 2 is TRNI(P, τ g ).
b) Using an equivalent function to declassify: In most type systems for declassification, the declassifier function or expression must be identical to the one in the policy. Indeed, policy is typically expressed by writing a "declassify" annotation on the expression [15] . However, the type system presented in [12, § 5 ] is more permissive: it accepts a declassification if it is semantically equivalent to the policy function, according to a given syntactically defined approximation of equivalence. Verification tools can go even further in reasoning with semantic equivalence [20] , [22] , but any automated checker is limited due to undecidability of semantic equivalence.
We consider a policy P where there are two confidential inputs x and y, x can be declassified via f , and y can be declassified via g, f : int → τ , and g : int → τ for some τ . Suppose that there exists an action a s.t. f •a = g semantically. With the encoding in §V, we accept g y, or rather x g y, but we cannot accept x f (x a y) even though it is semantically the same. To allow both, we have devised an encoding similar to the extension described above for policies with multiple declassifiers, where y is viewed as a confidential input that can be declassified via g or f • a.
B. Global policies
We now consider policies where a declassifier can involve more than one confidential input. To be consistent with [12] , we call such policies global policies. For simplicity, in this subsection, we consider a policy P where there are two confidential inputs, x 1 and x 2 , which can be declassified via f of the type
Notice that here we use subscripts for the input type of f to mean that the confidential input x i is corresponding to i-th element of an input of f .
Example VI.1 (Average can be declassified). We consider the policy P Ave where there are two confidential inputs x 1 and x 2 and their average can be declassified. That is x 1 and x 2 can be declassified via
In our encoding, we need to maintain the correspondence between inputs and arguments of the declassifier since we want to prevent laundering attacks [15] . A laundering attack occurs, for example, when the declassifier f is applied to x 1 , x 1 , since then the value of x 1 is leaked.
In the general case, to encode the requirement that a specific n-tuple of confidential inputs can be declassified via f , we introduce a new variable y. The basic idea is that y is corresponding to that n-tuple of confidential inputs, x i cannot be declassified, and only y can be declassified via f . Therefore, the confidential and public views are as below, where for readability we show the case n = 2.
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, since x i cannot be declassified, the indisinguishability for α xi is the same as the one for α x described in Fig. 3 . Since y corresponds to the tuple of confidential inputs and only it can be declassified via f , indistinguishability for the type of y in the public view α f is as below (again, case n = 2).
We next encode the correspondence between inputs and argument of the declassifier. We say that a term substitution γ is consistent w.r.t. Γ P P if γ |= δ P (Γ P P ) and in addition, for all i ∈ {1, 2}, π i (γ(y)) = γ(x i ). As we can see, the additional condition takes care of the correspondence of inputs and the arguments of the intended declassifier.
We next define the type substitution and indistinguishable term substitutions for P. We say that δ P |= ∆ P P when δ P (α f ) = int×int and for all α xi , δ P (α xi ) = int. We say that two term substitutions γ 1 and γ 2 are indistinguishable w.r.t.
Then we can define TRNI(P, τ ) as in Def. V.4 (except that we use the new definition of indistinguishable term substitutions). We also have the free theorem stating that if e has no type variable and ∆ P P , Γ P P ⊢ e : τ , then e is TRNI(P, τ ). The proof goes through without changes.
Example VI.2 (Average can be declassified -cont.). Here we present the encoding for the policy P Ave described in Example VI.1. The confidential and public views for this policy is as below:
We can easily check that the program y f y is TRNI(P Ave , int); it is well-typed in both views, and in the public view its type is int.
VII. TRNI FOR MODULE CALCULUS
This section recapitulates the development of §V but using an encoding suited to the module calculus. Our module calculus is the same as that of Crary [9] except that we add int for integers. The calculus covers a large fragment of ML with modules, signatures, type constructors, kinds, recursion, higher-order functors, and sealing [44]. Crary's calculus, needed to prove our theorems, is very involved and we omit it in the body of the paper (syntax, static semantics, dynamic semantics can be found in appendix): instead we decide to present our encoding by examples in ML. Our security proof relies on Crary's abstraction theorem for terms. 5 The statement of Crary's abstraction theorem is simple and is similar to the statement of Theorem IV.3, i.e. a well-typed term e is related to itself by the defined logical relation. (The logical relation and abstraction theorem for terms of the module calculus can be found in appendix.)
We present the idea of the encoding for the module calculus. (Formalization of the encoding can be found in appendix.) To make the presentation easier to follow, in this section, we write examples in standard ML (SML). These examples are checked with SML of New Jersey, version v110.85 [45] .
For a policy P, we construct the public view and the confidential view by using signatures containing type information of confidential inputs and their associated declassifiers. In particular, the signature for the confidential view is a transparent signature which exposes the type information of confidential input, while the signature for the public view is an opaque one which hides the type information of confidential inputs. For example, for the policy P OE (see Example III.2), we have the following signatures, where transOE and opaqOE are respectively the transparent signature for the confidential view and the opaque signature for the public view.
Note that different from §V, a program has only a module input which is of the transparent signature and contains all confidential inputs and their declassifiers. A program can use the input via the module variable m. For example, for P OE , we have the program m.f m.x, which is corresponding to the program x f x in Example V. 5 .
As in §V, we define indistinguishability as an instantation of the logical relation, and we say that a term e is TRNI(P, τ ) if on indistinguishable substitutions w.r.t. P, it generates indistinguishable outputs at τ . By using the abstraction theorem for terms, we have the following free theorem.
Theorem VII.1 (Free theorem). If the type of e in the public view is τ , then e is TRNI(P, τ ).
For the module calculus, when e is well-typed in the public view, e is also well-typed in the confidential view. Therefore, different from Theorem V.10 which requires that e has no type variable, Theorem VII.1 only requires that e is well-typed in the public view.
Our example program m.f m.x typechecks at int, so by Theorem VII.1 it is TRNI(P OE , int).
A. Usage of our approach
We can use our approach with ordinary ML implementations. In the case that the source programs are already parameterized by one module for their confidential inputs and their declassifiers, then there is no need to modify source programs at all.
For example, we consider program described below. Here M is a module of the transparent signature transOE. By sealing this module with the opaque signature opaqOE, we get the module opaqM 6 . Intuitively, program is TRNI(P OE , int) since the declassifier f is applied to the confidential input x. We also come to the same conclusion from the fact that the type of this program is int.
So far our discussion is about open terms but the ML type checker only applies to closed terms. In the case that the client program is open (i.e. that it can receive any module of the transparent signature as an input, as in the program m.f m.x presented above), in order to be able to type check it for a policy, we need to close it by putting in a closing context, which we call wrapper. For any program e and policy P, the wrapper is written using a functor as shown below, where opaqP is the opaque signature for the public view of P. Type τ is the type at which we want to check security of e. (The identifiers program and wrapper are arbitrary.)
Note that e is unchanged.
We have proved that if the wrapper wrap P (e) is of the signature from opaqP to τ , then the type of e in the public view is τ . Therefore, from Theorem VII.1, e is TRNI at τ . For instance, for the policy P OE , we have that wrap P (m.f m.x) is of the signature from transOE to int and hence, we infer that the type of m.f m.x in the public view is int and hence, m.f m.x is TRNI(P OE , int).
B. Extension
As in the case of the simple calculus, our encoding for ML can also be extended for global policies. Here, for illustration purpose, we present the encoding for a global policy which is inspired by two-factor authentication.
Example VII.2. The policy P Aut involves two confidential passwords and two declassifiers checking1 and checking2 as below, where input1 and input2 are respectively the first input and the second input from a user. Notice that checking2 takes a tuple of two passwords as its input.
We next construct the confidential view and the public view for the policy. Since the policy involves two confidential passwords, by using the idea presented in §VI-B, we introduce a new variable (i.e. passwords) which corresponding to the tuple of the two passwords. The transparent and public signatures used for the confidential and the public views of P Aut are as below. We have that programs m.checking2 m.passwords and m.checking1 m.password1, where m is a module variable of the transparent signature transAut, have the type int in the public view and hence both programs are TRNI(P Aut , int).
VIII. CONCLUSION
We show how to express declassification policies by using standard types of the simply typed lambda calculus as well as a module calculus that covers a large fragment of pure ML. By means of parametricity, we prove soundness for TRNI, showing a direct connection between declassification and parametricity. Although we focus on confidentiality and declassification, our approach applies as well to integrity and endorsement. Many endorsement policies involve sanitization functions that are explicitly applied in the code, which fits well with the wrapper style of interface.
Our approach should be applicable to other languages that have an abstraction theorem (e.g [33] , [34] , [37] - [39] ) with the potential benefit of strong security assurance from off the shelf type checkers. To realize this potential, one current limitation remains a significant challenge. The abstraction theorem characterizes the overall behavior of a program unit, whereas practical information flow policies distinguish between parts of the behavior considered visible to observers of differing classification. Computations producing both secret and public outputs can be expressed in DCC, for example, and the encodings of DCC (Section II) handle this by translation of the source code as well as types. An open problem is whether this is a fundamental limitation; in particular, do type systems like that of ML admit an encoding such that TRNI for multi-level computations can be checked on un-modified source code?
Given that logical relations can exactly characterize contextual equivalence [9] , [43] , [46] , a natural alternative to our use of the abstraction theorem is to formulate TRNI via some policy-determined notion of context. In exploring that idea we obtained preliminary results in which the logical relation-based indistinguishability implies contextual equivalence-based indistinguishability, but further investigation is needed.
Vanhoef et al. [47] and others have proposed more expressive declassification policies than the ones in Li and Zdancewic [12] : policies that keep state and can be written as programs. We speculate that TRNI for stateful declassification policies can be obtained for free in a language with stateindeed, our work provides motivation for development of abstraction theorems for such languages.
Another direction of future work is to formalize our results in Coq, building on Crary's formalization [9] . We do not see impediments to doing so, but it is a substantial development and in fact has not yet been ported to the current version of Coq [48] . Such a formalization would be especially valuable once we have overcome some limitations of our current results, so that the approach can be applied to real programs.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The first and second authors were partially supported by NSF award CNS-1718713.
[43] A. M. Pitts, "Typed operational reasoning," Lemma IV.1. Suppose that ρ ∈ Rel(δ 1 , δ 2 ) for some δ 1 and δ 2 . For i ∈ {1, 2}, it follows that:
Proof. The second part of the lemma follows directly from rule FR-Term. We prove the first part of the lemma by induction on structure of τ .
Case 1: int. We consider 
Case 4:
ev ρ . From IH on τ 1 and the second part of the lemma on τ 2 , we have that ⊢ v
Proof. We prove the theorem by induction on typing derivation.
Case 1: Rule FT-Int.
The proof is closed for this case.
Since there is no type variable in x, we have that δ 1 γ 1 (x) = γ 1 (x) and δ 2 γ 2 (x) = γ 2 (x). As proven above,
ρ . The proof is closed for this case.
From IH, it follows that
ev ρ , and
From the FR-Term, we have that
* v 11 , v 12 , and
From FR-Term, we have that
From IH, we have that 
Thus,
ev ρ . This case is closed.
ev ρ . Hence, we have that
ev ρ . From the semantics of the language and the FR-Term rule, it follows that
ev ρ . The proof is closed for this case.
The proof follows from IH and rule FR-Fun.
APPENDIX B PROOFS OF SECTION V
Lemma V.7. ρ P ∈ Rel(δ P , δ P ).
Proof. We need to prove that for any type variable α, if v 1 , v 2 ∈ ρ P (α), then ⊢ v i : δ P (α) and hence ⊢ v i : int according to the definition (1). This follows directly from the definition of ρ P and rules Eq-Var1, Eq-Var2, and Eq-Var3.
Lemma B.1. Suppose that ⊢ v : τ It follows that:
Proof. We prove the case of int first by case analysis on typing rules. The FT-Int rule gives us the desired result. The other rules cannot be instantiated with an expression that is a value and of the int type.
We prove the case of τ 1 → τ 2 by case analysis on typing rules. The FT-Fun rule gives us the desired result. The other rules cannot be instantiated with an expression that is a value and of the τ 1 → τ 2 type.
The proof for the case τ 1 × τ 2 is similar.
Lemma V.8. It follows that 
From the definition of ρ P and the FR-Var rule,
Case 3: α f . The proof is similar to the one of Case 2. Case 4: α f •a . The proof is similar to the one of Case 2.
. From the definition of indistinguishability, we have that 
. From Eq-Term, we have that e i * v i for some v i and
. As proven above, we have that
. We need to prove that for any v
ρP . We need to prove that for any v
We now need to prove that
From the construction of Γ P P , we have the following cases. Case 1: Γ P P (x) = α x . From the assumption, we have that
ρP , where ⊢ a : int → int. From FR-Fun, we need to prove that for any 
A. Syntax and semantics
This section presents a module calculus, essentially the same as that of Crary [9] except that we add int for integers. Crary's calculus is adapted from Dreyer's thesis [44] , and the reader should consult these references for explanations and motivation. The calculus has static expressions: kinds (k), constructors (c) and signatures (σ), and dynamic expressions: terms (e) and modules (M ). The syntax is in Fig. 4 . Notice that every module variable is associated with a constructor variable that represents its static part [9] . The relation is maintained by twinned variables: α/m : σ meaning that m has signature σ and its static part is α which is of the kind Fst(σ), where for any signature σ, Fst(σ) extracts the information about kind from σ. Whenever m : σ and Fst(m) ≫ c, it follows that c is of the kind Fst(σ). 
Impure well-formed module (Fig 18)   Fig. 7 . Judgment forms in the static semantics c) Signature: Signatures include unit signature, atomic kind signature, atomic type signature, signatures for generative functors, applicative functors and pairs. Since a module does not appear in static part of a signature, we have only α in dependent signatures (instead of twinned variables, e.g. α/m, as in the case of modules). In the binding α : σ within a dependent signature, α corresponds to the static part of some module of the signature σ. Thus, α has the kind Fst(σ).
As In the module calculus, M is (|int|), |0| , |λx : int.e| . Using abbreviations, σ T is (|S(int)|), |int| , |int → τ f | and σ O is Σα : (|T|). |α| , |α → τ f | . 7 The signature σ T is a transparent signature of M since σ T exposes the information of the static part of M , as (|S(int)|). The signature σ O is an opaque signature of M since σ O hides the information of the static part of M , as (|T|).
d) Static semantics:
The judgment forms in the static semantics are described in Figure 7 . W.r.t. the static semantics, for the signatures described in Example C.1, it follows that the transparent signature σ T is a sub-signature of the opaque signature Example C.2 (Opaque signature). We consider a module M = (|int|), |0| and show that it has the opaque signature σ O = Σα : (|T|). |α| 8 . We then have that M is a pure module of the signature σ O (i.e. ⊢ P M : σ O ). First, we have that M is a module of a transparent signature, i.e. ⊢ P M : Σα : (|S(int)|). |int| by instantiating the ofm pair rule.
EQK REFL
Next, we have that ⊢ Σα : (|S(int)|). |int| ≤ Σα : (|T|). |α| , by the derivation described in Fig. 19 : Finally, it follows that ⊢ P M : σ O .
OFM SUBSUME ⊢ P (|int|), |0| : Σα : (|S(int)|). |int| ⊢ Σα : (|S(int)|). |int| ≤ Σα : (|T|). |α| ⊢ P M : Σα : (|T|). |α| From [9] , we have the following lemma about the correctness of Fst(M ) ≫ c operation.
To facilitate the proofs about TRNI for ML, from the static semantics, we have the following lemma.
Lemma C.4 (Weakening).
Suppose that ⊢ Γ, α : k ok. It follows that:
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ σ : sig, Γ ⊢ c :
e) Dynamic semantics:
The dynamic semantics is given by call-by value semantics. We have dynamic semantics for terms Γ ⊢ e e ′ and for modules Γ ⊢ M M ′ (see Fig. 20 and Fig. 21 ), where the context Γ is only used to extract the static part of module values. Open term values and module values are as below.
In the tstep fix rule, λ : unit.fix τ e means that the term variable bound by λ is a fresh variable. To be precise, the variable must not be in dom (Γ) , and in addition it should be canonically chosen, to maintain strict determinacy of evaluation. In Crary's deBruin representation this is automatic.
We use V, W as metavariables for module values. We write e ↓ when the evaluation of e terminates. Similarly, we have M ↓.
TSTEP APP1
Γ ⊢ e 1 e 
TSTEP FIX
Γ ⊢ fixτ e e (λ : unit.fixτ e)
TSTEP LETT1
B. Logical relation
In order to define logical relation, we define some auxiliary notions as in [9] Given a relation R ∈ Rel(τ, τ ′ ), R s contains continuations that agree on values related by R. Conversely, given a relation S on continuations, related continuations by S agree on terms in S t . From s and t , we define Pitts closed relations.
We have similar definitions for relations defined on closed signatures σ 1 and σ 2 , where the signatures for continuations are Π gn α : σ 1 .1 and Π gn α : σ 2 .1, which can be abbreviated as σ 1 → 1 and σ 2 → 1. Apropos the stev closure, we may be able to infer indirectly that two terms are related by R stev when these two terms depend on terms related by Q stev .
Definition C.6. Suppose x : ̺ ⊢ e : τ . We say that x is active in e if for all closed e ′ s.t. ⊢ e ′ : ̺, e[x → e ′ ] ↓ implies e ′ ↓. 
From [9] and Lemma wf mr in [49], we have the following lemma about properties of logical interpretations of constructors, kinds and signatures.
a) Precandiate.: As in [9] , we next present simple kinds which are used in the definitions of logical interpretations of dependent kinds. A simple kind is a kind that does not have singleton kinds. Given a kind k, simp(k) returns a simple kind by replacing singleton kinds in k with T. A candidate of a kind is a pre-candidate which is in an interpretation of a kind. We use Q as a meta-variable for pre-candidates in general, Φ for pre-candidates over function kinds, P for pre-candidates over pair kinds, and R for pre-candidates over T.
Val {v | ∃τ. ⊢ v : τ } Con {c | ∃k. ⊢ c : k}
PreCand k1×k2 PreCand k1 × PreCand k2 b) Logical interpretations for kinds and constructors.: Following [9] , we generalize ρ presented in §IV to a mapping that maps constructor variables to tuples of the form c, c ′ , Q , term variables to tuples of the form v, v ′ , and module variables to tuples of the form V, V ′ . Notice that in the simple language, for any α ∈ dom(ρ), ρ(α) = R ∈ Rel(τ 1 , τ 2 ) for some τ 1 and τ 2 . If we use the notation in this section, then we have that ρ(α) = τ 1 , τ 2 , R . We write ρ L and ρ R for the substitutions that map every variable in the domain of ρ to respectively the first element and the second element of the tuple that ρ maps that variable to. If we do not have module variables, then, ρ L ( ) is similar to δ 1 γ 1 ( ) and ρ R ( ) is similar to δ 2 γ 2 ( ) in §IV, where δ 1 and δ 2 are type substitutions in ρ, and γ 1 and γ 2 are term substitutions in ρ. 
Definition C.9. We say that ρ, ρ We say that
• for all x : τ ∈ Γ, there exists ρ(
Terms e and e ′ are logically equivalent at τ in Γ (written as Γ ⊢ e ∼ e ′ : τ ) if ⊢ Γ ok implies Γ ⊢ e, e ′ : τ , and for
ρ . Notice that equivalence holds vacuously, if Γ is not well formed, but we are never interested in such Γ.
Theorem C.10 (Abstraction theorem). Suppose that
In [9] , there are similar results for pure modules and impure modules. Later we express security in terms of sealed modules, but our security proof only relies on the abstraction theorem for expressions.
APPENDIX D TRNI FOR THE MODULE CALCULUS
This section recapitulates the development of §V but using an encoding suited to the module calculus. The free theorem that typing implies security (Theorem VII.1) is formulated for an open term in context of the public view, as in Theorem V.10. We then develop a "wrapper" to encapsulate the typing problem in a closed form. That could facilitate use of an unmodified ML compiler without recourse to an API for the typechecker.
A. Local policy encoding
In this section, we present the encoding for local policies by using the module calculus. Here, a declassification function or an action can be written in the module calculus with recursive functions. However, for simplicity and for coherent policy, we assume-as in §III-that the applications of declassifiers on confidential input values always terminate. In §V, a view is a typing context that declares variables for inputs and for declassifiers. Here, those are gathered in a signature and the view is a context that declares a module of that signature.
Let L ⊆ V P be a finite list of distinct confidential input variables from V P . An empty list is []. We write x :: L to concatenate a confidential input variable to L. In §V we define operations − C and − P that apply to policy variables and declasifiers, yielding the encoding of policy as typing contexts. Here we use the same notation, but apply the operations to variable lists and encode policy as signatures. First, we define L C to return a transparent signature of the policy. It is defined inductively as described in Fig. 24 . As in §V, we use fresh constructor variables with names that indicate their role in the encoding. For a confidential input x, basically, the signature is a pair containing information about the kind of its type, its type, and the types of associated declassifiers. For example, for x that can be declassified via f , the signature contains: (1) the kind of the type of x: (|S(int)|), (2) the type of x: |int| , and (3) the type of f : |int → τ f | . When x can be declassified via f • a, in addition to these, we also have the kind of the type of the result of a which is |S(int)| . Fig. 24 . Transparent and opaque signatures for a policy P.
Example D.1 (Transparent signature). For P OE (Example III.2), since f = λx : int.x mod 2 is of the type int → int, by applying the third case in − C with τ f = int, we get the signature
that can be abbreviated as (|S(int)|), |int| , |int → int| , 1 . In ML it looks like sig type t=int val x:int val f:int->int end.
For P H (Example III.3), since f = λx : int.x mod 2 64 is of the type int → int, by applying the last case in − C with τ f = int, we get the signature
We overload L P to get an opaque signature of the policy. The idea is similar to L C , except that here we use constructor variables of the T kind for types of confidential inputs and in types of declassification functions and actions. The definition is described in Fig. 24 .
Example D.2 (Opaque signature). For P OE (Example III.2), since f = λx : int.x mod 2 is of the type int → int, by applying the third case in − P with τ f = int, we get the signature
In ML it looks like sig type t val x:t val f: t->int end.
For P H (Example III.3), since f = λx : int.x mod 2 64 is of the type int → int, by applying the last case of − P with τ f = int, we get the signature
Hereafter, we abuse V P and use it as a list and we write σ C P and σ P to mean respectively V P C and V P P . In order to define TRNI, we define the confidential view and the public view as in §V. The confidential view is based on the constructed transparent signature σ C P , and the public view is based on the constructed opaque signature σ P .
To express what in Example V.1 and Example V.2 (for P OE ) is written x f x, in the module calculus x is accessed as Ext(π 1 (π 2 m P OE )) and x f is accessed as Ext(π 1 (π 2 (π 2 m P OE ))).
From the definitions, we have that σ C P and σ P are closed and well-formed signatures, and σ C P is a subsignature of σ P .
B. TRNI
In order to define an environment ρ for the policy, we define three relations, R x , R f , and R f •a , similar to the relations
∅ is the empty environment. Given a list L of confidential inputs from P and an environment ρ, we say that ρ ∈ |L| P when • ρ maps m P in Γ P P to related module values V 1 and V 2 for some V 1 and V 2 s.t. V 1 and V 2 are of the transparent signature V P C and functions and actions in V 1 and V 2 are declassification functions and actions from the policy, and the confidential values in V 1 and V 2 are related by R x , R f , or R f •a according to the policy, and • ρ maps α P to a tuple c 1 , c 2 , Q where c 1 and c 2 are static parts from respectively V 1 and V 2 , and Q depends on the policy. That is if an element in Q is corresponding to an α x : (|T|), then this element is R x , if an element in Q is corresponding to an α f : (|T|), then this element is R f , and if an element in Q is corresponding to an α f •a : (|T|), then this element is R f •a . The definition of ρ ∈ |L| P is as below. Hereafter, we write ρ |= full P when ρ ∈ |V P | P .
Definition D.3 (full environments for P). Given L ⊆ V P , we define the set |L| P of environments by ρ ∈ |L| P iff dom(ρ) = {α P , m P } and
Example D.4 (ρ |= full P OE ). In this example, we present a full environment for P OE . We first define R f , where f = λx : int.x mod 2.
Following the definition of ρ |= full P OE , we construct ρ as below. Notice that 2, 4 ∈ R f .
It follows that ρ |= full P OE .
Next we prove that if τ is a type in the public view Γ P P , then all its logical interpretations are the same.
. Therefore, we define indistinguishability based on an arbitrary ρ |= full P.
Definition D.6 (Indistinguishability). Suppose ρ and τ satisfy ρ |= full P and Γ P P ⊢ τ : T.
• Values v 1 and v 2 are indistinguishable at τ (written as
• Terms e 1 and e 2 are indistinguishable at τ (written as e 1 , e 2 
Example D.7 (Indistinguishability). We consider P OE (Example III.2). As described in Example D.2, the opaque signature of the policy is σ POE = Σα f : (|T|).Σα 1 : |α f | .Σα 2 : |α f → int| .1. Thus, the public view Γ POE P is α POE /m POE : σ POE . Notice that since α POE and m POE are twinned, it follows that α POE is of the kind Fst(σ P ) = Σα f : T.Σα 1 : 1.Σα 2 : 1.1.
We consider the type π 1 α POE . By a rule for well-formed constructors (rule ofc pi1), we have that Γ POE P ⊢ π 1 α POE : T. Thus, we can define indistinguishability for this type. As presented in Example D.4, ρ |= full P OE . Therefore, we have that
Next, we define TRNI for the module calculus. The definition here is similar to the one in §V.
Definition D.8 (TRNI for the module calculus).
A term e is TRNI(P, τ ) if Γ P C ⊢ e, and Γ P P ⊢ τ : T, and for all ρ
Example D.9. We consider the program e = (Ext(π 1 (π 2 (π 2 m P OE )))) (Ext(π 1 (π 2 m P OE ))), which is corresponding to the program x f x in Example V.11, as noted following Eqn. (2) . We now check e with the definition of TRNI. We consider an arbitrary ρ |= full P OE . As described in Example D.4, ρ is as below, where
We have that
Therefore, e is TRNI(P OE , int).
C. Free theorem: typing in the public view implies security
To apply the abstraction theorem to get the free theorem, we need the following.
Proof. Since Γ P P ⊢ e : τ , from Theorem C.10, we have that Γ P P ⊢ e ∼ e : τ . Thus, for any ρ ∈ [[Γ
full , it follows that:
We consider an arbitrary ρ s.t. ρ |= full P. From Lemma D.10, it follows that ρ ∈ [[Γ
In addition, since Γ P P ⊢ e : τ , from Lemma D.11, it follows that Γ P C ⊢ e. Therefore, e is TRNI(P, τ ).
Example D.12 (Typing implies TRNI). We consider the policy P OE . As described in Example D.1 and Example D.2, the transparent signature and the opaque signature of the policy are as below.
Thus, the confidential view is Γ POE C = α POE /m POE : σ C POE , and the public view is Γ POE P = α POE /m POE : σ POE . We now look at the program e = e 1 e 2 , where e 1 = (Ext(π 1 (π 2 (π 2 m P OE )))) and e 2 = (Ext(π 1 (π 2 m P OE ))). This program is corresponding to the program x f x in Example V.11, as noted following definition (2) . We have that Γ POE C ⊢ e 1 : int → int, Γ POE C ⊢ e 2 : int, Γ POE P ⊢ e 1 : π 1 α POE → int, and Γ POE P ⊢ e 2 : π 1 α POE . Therefore, we have that Γ POE C ⊢ e : int, and Γ POE P ⊢ e : int and hence, from Theorem VII.1, the program is TRNI (P OE , int) .
Similarly, we have that the expression corresponding to the program x f (x a x) in Example D.12, is well-typed in both views of P H , and in the public view, its types is int. Thus, the program is TRNI (P H , int) .
public view is not equivalent to τ or the program is not well-typed in the public view.
We consider the policy P OE and the program Ext(π 1 (π 2 m P OE )), which is corresponding to the program x in Example V.12. This program is not TRNI(P OE , int) since Ext(π 1 (π 2 m P OE )) itself is confidential and cannot be directly declassified. In the public view of the policy, the type of this program is π 1 α POE which is not equivalent to int.
We consider another program: e = (Ext(π 1 (π 2 m P OE ))) mod 3, which is corresponding to the program x mod 3 in Example V.12. This program is not TRNI(P OE , π 1 α POE ) since it may map indistinguishable inputs to non-indistinguishable outputs. For example, we consider ρ |= full P OE presented in Example D.7. We have that ρ L (e) = 2 mod 3 = 2, and ρ R (e) = 4 mod 3 = 1. As described in Example D.7,
As explained above, e is not TRNI(P OE , π 1 α POE ). In the public view, it is not well-typed since the type of Ext(π 1 (π 2 m P OE )) is π 1 α POE , which is not equivalent to int, and mod expects int arguments.
D. Wrapper
In this section, we will transform an open term to a closed module. We then prove that if the closed module is well-typed in the empty context, then the original open term is well-typed in the public view and hence, e is TRNI. Thus we can use our approach with ordinary ML implementations.
If the source programs are already parameterized by one module for their confidential inputs and their declassification functions, then there is no need to modify source programs at all.
We next define a wrapper that wraps e with the information from the public view.
From the construction, we have that if wrap P (e) is well-typed in the empty context, then the original term is also welltyped in the public view. In addition, we can infer the type of the original term in the public view. These results yield, by Theorem VII.1, that the original term is TRNI when the wrapper is well-typed.
Theorem D.14. If ⊢ P wrap P (e) : Π gn α P : σ P . |τ | , then e is TRNI(P, τ ).
Example D. 15 . In this example, we combine the ideas presented in §VI-B, §D-A, and §D-D to encode a complex policy which is inspired by two-factor authentication. The policy P Aut involves two confidential passwords and two declassifiers checking1 and checking2 written in SML as below, where input1 and input2 are respectively the first input and the second input from a user. Notice that checking2 takes a tuple of two passwords as its input.
Using the ideas presented in §VI-B, we introduce a new variable which corresponding to the tuple of two passwords. The confidential and public signatures of P Aut in the module calculus are as below, where f 1 and f 2 are corresponding to checking1 and checking2.
Σα x2 : (|S(int)|).Σα 3 : |int| .
Σα x2 : (|T|).Σα 3 : |α x2 | . Σα f2 : (|T|).Σα 4 : |α f2 | .
The confidential and public signatures of P Aut in SML are as below. As in §VI-B, we require that for ρ
password2 (and we have a similar requirement for ρ R ). In order to define indistinguishability for P Aut , we need to define ρ |= full P Aut 11 , and hence, we define R f1 , R x2 , R f2 as below.
By using the wrapper presented in above, we can check that programs m PAut .checking2 m PAut .passwords and m PAut .checking1 m PAut .password1 are TRNI(P Aut , int), where m PAut is the module variable in confidential and public views of P Aut .
Remark D.16 (On wrapper). We may choose an applicative functor for wrapping the original program. However, w.r.t. this choice, we need to handle more cases in proofs. Thus, we choose a generative functor.
APPENDIX E PROOFS FOR TRNI FOR THE MODULE CALCULUS
A. Properties of the encoding
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on L. We have four cases.
Case 1:
We have that V P C = 1. From the ofs one rule, it follows that ⊢ 1 : sig. 
From the ofs dyn rule, ⊢ |int → τ | : sig. Thus, we have that:
In addition, by using a reasoning similar to the one in Case 2, we have:
Therefore, we have that:
By using a reasoning similar to the one in Case 3, we have that
Thus, we have that:
We have that L P = 1. From the ofs one rule, we have that ⊢ 1 : sig.
We have the following derivation. Notice that Fst( |c| ) = 1 for any c, and Fst((|T)|)) = T.
We have that α f : T ⊢ α f : T and ⊢ τ : T (notice that ⊢ f : int → τ and hence, ⊢ int → τ : T and hence, ⊢ τ : T). From ofc arrow, we have that α f :
In addition, by using a reasoning similar to the one in Case 2, we have that:
sig. Thus, we have that:
Proof. We prove the lemma by proving that for any L, ⊢ L C ≤ L P : sig. We prove this by induction on L. We have four cases.
We have that L C = L P = 1. From eqs refl, we have that ⊢ 1 ≡ 1 : sig and hence, from the subs refl rule, it follows that ⊢ 1 ≤ 1 : sig.
Case 2: L = x :: L ′ and x ∈ dom(F P ). We need to prove that ⊢ Σα
To this aim, we prove that α x : S(int) ⊢ |int| ≤ |α x | : sig.
We next prove that ⊢ (|S(int)|) ≤ (|T|) : sig. From ofc int, it follows that ⊢ int : T. From subk sing t, it follows that ⊢ S(int) ≤ T : kind. From subs stat, it follows that ⊢ (|S(int)|) ≤ (|T|) : sig.
We now prove that
: L ′ and F P (x) = f , where ⊢ f : int → τ for some τ . We need to prove that
We first prove that α f :
We next prove that α f : S(int), α 1 :
sig (from IH) and hence, from Lemma C.4, it follows that α f : S(int),
2) and hence, from Lemma C.4, it follows that α f : S(int), α 1 : 1, α 2 : 1 ⊢ L ′ P : sig Since Fst( |c| ) = 1 for any c, we have that:
We have that:
sig, from the ofs sigma rule, it follows that α f : S(int),
Since Fst( |c| ) = 1 for any c, we have that:
We have that Case 2) , and
Since α f : T ⊢ α f : T, from the ofs dyn rule, α f : T ⊢ |α f | : sig. Since α f : T ⊢ |α f | : sig and α f : T,
From the subs sigma rule, we have that
Case 4: L = x :: L ′ and F P (x) = f • a, where ⊢ f : int → τ for some τ . We need to prove that
By using reasoning similar to the one in the proof of Case 3, we have that:
Therefore, by using reasoning similar to the one in Case 3, we have that:
We also have that:
sig From subs sigma, it follows that
In addition, we have that:
Lemma E.4 (Pitts closure). For any x, f and a in the policy, it follows that R x , R f and R f •a are Pitts closed.
Proof. We consider R x first. The proof of this case is trivial since any v 1 and v 2 s.t. ⊢ v i : int, we have that
We next consider R f , where ⊢ f : int → τ . We consider x : int ⊢ f x. We have that x is active in f x. We now consider arbitrary v 1 and v 2 s.t.
We have proven that:
We now consider R f •a , where ⊢ a : int → int and ⊢ f : int → τ . We consider x : int ⊢ f (a x). We have that x is active in f (a x). We now consider arbitrary v 1 and
Lemma E.5. For any L ⊆ V P and ρ ∈ |L| P , it follows that
Proof. The first part of the Lemma E.5 is from the definition of ρ ∈ |L| P . The second part follows from the first part, Lemma E.3, and the subsumption rule.
. It follows that:
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on L, using the definition of ρ ∈ |L| P .
We have that σ = 1 and k = 1, ρ(α P ) = ⋆, ⋆, . We can easily check that ⊢ 1 : kind, ⊢ ⋆ : 1, and ⋆, ⋆, ,
, where x ∈ dom(F P ). We have that
We need to prove that:
Since their proofs are similar, we only prove here ⊢ int, ⋆, c
We have the following derivations. Notice that
• ⊢ Fst( L 
We now prove that int, ⋆, c
. We now need to prove that:
• As shown in the first derivation in the proof above, we have that ⊢ ⋆, c
• Similarly, ⊢ c
• Since L ′ ⊆ V P and ρ ′ ∈ |L ′ | P , from IH, c
As in Case 2, we have that ⊢ k : kind and ⊢ int, ⋆, ⋆, c
That is we need to prove that:
, where ρ 3 = ρ 2 , α 2 → ⋆, ⋆, . The first item can be easily verified (as in Case 2) . From Lemma E.4, R f is Pitts closed and hence, int, int,
We can easily verify that ⋆, ⋆, ,
′ , and
The proofs for the first two parts of the lemma for this case are similar to the ones of Case 2. For the last part, we need to prove that
, where ρ 5 = ρ 4 , α 3 → ⋆, ⋆, . These items can be proven by using IH (notice that L ′ ⊆ V P and ρ ′ ∈ |L ′ | P ), Lemma E.4, Lemma C.8, and interpretations of kinds as in Case 2 and Case 3.
Proof. From the definition of ρ i ∈ |V P | P , we have that ρ 1 (α P ) = ρ 2 (α P ) = c 1 , c 2 , Q for some c 1 , c 2 , and Q. From Lemma E.6 and the definition of constructor equivalence, we have that:
In other words, Fig. 22 ), it follows that
Proof. We need to prove that ρ |= full [[α P /m P : V P P ]]. We claim that for any L ⊆ V P and any ρ ∈ |L| P , it follows that
. Then the proof follows directly from the claim. We now prove the claim. Suppose that ρ(α P ) = c 1 , c 2 , Q and ρ(m P ) = V 1 , V 2 . From Lemma E.6, we have that:
. Thus, we only need to prove two following items:
We prove these two items by induction on L, using the definition of ρ ∈ |L| P . We have four cases.
We have that σ = L P = 1, ρ(m P ) = ⋆, ⋆ and ρ(α P ) = ⋆, ⋆, . In other words,
Case 2: L = x :: L ′ , x ∈ dom(F P ). We have that:
and v 1 , v 2 ∈ R x , and ρ ′ ∈ |L ′ | P , where
We also have that ρ = Σα x : (|T|).Σα :
, Q ′ , and ρ ′ ∈ |L ′ | P , from IH, we have that:
, and
We now need to prove that (|int|),
, we need to prove that:
, . These items are proven as below.
• From Lemma E.5, ⊢ P V 1 : L P and hence
• Similarly, we have that
, from the ofm pair rule,
• From the requirement on v 1 and v 2 in ρ ∈ |L| P , and the definition of
The proof that ρ(α P ) = Fst(V 1 ), Fst(V 2 ), Q is similar to the one in Case 2. We now prove that
, where ρ 2 = ρ 1 , α 1 → ⋆, ⋆, . We have that:
• By using similar reasoning as in Case 2 
. We need to prove that:
, where ρ 3 = ρ 2 , α 2 → ⋆, ⋆, . We have that:
• By using similar reasoning as in Case 2,
The proof is similar to the proof of Case 3. Here, we write only the proofs of interesting parts.
We consider w 1 , w 2 ∈ R f •a . From the assumption about terminations of applications of declassifiers, a w i * w
By applying ρ 1L on the signature, we need to prove that:
We can easily prove that the module value is an impurely well-formed with the transparent signature:
In order to apply the ofm subsume rule and then closing the proof, we need to prove that the transparent signature is the subsignature of the desired signature:
sig, from subs sigma, we need to prove that
Since we have α f : S(int) in the context, we have that α f : S(int) ⊢ int ≡ α f . Thus, α f : S(int) ⊢ |int → int| ≡ |int → α f | : sig, and α f : S(int) ⊢ |int → int| ≡ |α f → τ | : sig. By using reasoning as in the proof of Lemma E.3, we have that
B. Wrapper
Lemma E.7. If Γ ⊢ P |e| : σ, then σ = |τ | for some τ and Γ ⊢ e : τ .
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ P |e| : σ. We consider the last rule applied in the derivation. We have two cases (since other rules cannot be applied).
Case 1: Rule ofm dyn.
The proof follows from the rule. Case 2: Rule ofm subsume.
From the rule, we have that
Proof. First we have that ⊢ P λ ap α P , m P : σ P . |e| : Π ap α P : σ P .(|τ |). From the weakening lemma (Lemma C.4), we have that α P , m P : σ C P ⊢ P λ ap α P , m P : σ P . |e| : Π ap α P : σ P .(|τ |). In addition, we have that α P , m P : σ C P ⊢ σ C P ≤ σ P : sig (Lemma E.3 and Lemma C.4) and α P , m P : σ C P ⊢ Fst(m P ) ≫ α P . Therefore, we have that:
and hence, α P , m P : σ
And thus, α P , m P : σ C P ⊢ (λ ap α P , m P : σ P . |e| ) m P : (|τ |) α P , m P : σ C P ⊢ e.
From the type preservation theorem ( [48, Theorem 2.2]), we have that α P , m P : σ C P ⊢ P |e| : (|τ |). From Lemma E.7, it follows that α P , m P : σ C P ⊢ P e. Lemma E.8. It follows that ⊢ P V P : σ C P . Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on L.
Lemma E.9. It follows that ⊢ I (V P :> σ P ) : σ P .
Proof. From Lemma E.8, we have that ⊢ P V P : σ C P . Since ⊢ σ C P ≤ σ P : sig (by Lemma E.3), from the ofm subsume rule, it follows that ⊢ P V P : σ P . From the ofm forget rule, we have that ⊢ I V P : σ P . From the ofm seal rule, we have that ⊢ I (V P :> σ P ) : σ P . Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the derivation of ⊢ I V :> σ : σ ′ . We consider the last rule applied in the derivation. We have two cases.
Case 1: Rule ofm seal. From the rule, we have that σ = σ ′ and hence, ⊢ σ ≤ σ ′ : sig. Case 2: Rule ofm subsume. From the rule, we have ⊢ I (V :> σ) : σ ′′ and ⊢ σ ′′ ≤ σ ′ : sig. Since ⊢ I (V :> σ) : σ ′′ , from IH, ⊢ σ ≤ σ ′′ : sig. Since ⊢ σ ≤ σ ′′ : sig and ⊢ σ ′′ ≤ σ ′ : sig, from the subs trans rule, it follows that ⊢ σ ≤ σ ′ : sig.
Lemma E.11. Suppose that Γ ⊢ τ : T. It follows that:
• if Γ ⊢ σ ≡ |τ | : sig, then σ = |τ ′ | for some τ ′ s.t. Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T,
• if Γ ⊢ |τ | ≡ σ : sig, then σ = |τ ′ | for some τ ′ s.t. Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on derivation of Γ ⊢ |τ | ≡ σ : sig and Γ ⊢ |τ | ≡ σ : sig. We consider the last rule applied. We have four cases (other rules cannot be the last rule of the derivation). Case 1: eqs refl. From the rule, we have that σ = |τ | . Since Γ ⊢ τ : T, from the eqc reflrule, we have that Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ : T.
Case 2: eqs symm. We consider Γ ⊢ |τ | ≡ σ : sig first. From the rule, we have that Γ ⊢ σ ≡ |τ | . From IH, σ = |τ ′ | for some τ ′ s.t. Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T. We now consider Γ ⊢ σ ≡ |τ | : sig. From the rule, we have that Γ ⊢ |τ | ≡ σ : sig. From IH, σ = |τ ′ | for some τ ′ s.t. Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T. Case 3: eqs transWe consider Γ ⊢ |τ | ≡ σ : sig first. From the rule, we have that Γ ⊢ |τ | ≡ σ ′ : sig and Γ ⊢ σ ′ ≡ σ : sig. From IH, it follows that σ ′ = |τ ′′ | for some τ ′′ s.t. Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′′ : T. From the static semantics, it follows that Γ ⊢ τ ′′ : T. Thus, from IH, σ = |τ ′ | for some τ ′ s.t. Γ ⊢ τ ′′ ≡ τ ′ : T. From the eqc trans rule, it follows that Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T. We now consider Γ ⊢ σ ≡ |τ | : sig. From the rule, we have that Γ ⊢ σ ≡ σ ′ : sig and Γ ⊢ σ ′ ≡ |τ | : sig. From IH, it follows that σ ′ = |τ ′′ | for some τ ′′ s.t. Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′′ : T. From the static semantics, it follows that Γ ⊢ τ ′′ : T. Thus, from IH, σ = |τ ′ | for some τ ′ s.t. Γ ⊢ τ ′′ ≡ τ ′ : T. From the eqc trans rule, it follows that Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T. Case 4: eqs dyn. We consider Γ ⊢ |τ | ≡ σ : sig first. From the rule, σ = |τ ′ | for some τ ′ and Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T. We now consider the case Γ ⊢ σ ≡ |τ | : sig. From the rule, σ = |τ ′ | for some τ ′ and Γ ⊢ τ ′ ≡ τ : T. From the eqc symm rule, it follows that Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T.
Lemma E.12. Suppose that Γ ⊢ |τ | ≤ σ : sig. It follows that Γ ⊢ |τ | ≡ σ : sig.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ |τ | ≤ σ : sig. We consider the last rule applied. We have two cases (other rules cannot be the last rule in the derivation). Lemma E. 13 . It follows that:
kind then k is 1.
• if Γ ⊢ 1 ≤ σ : sig then σ is 1,
• if Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≤ σ : sig then σ is (|T|).
Proof. We prove the first part of the lemma by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ 1 ≤ σ : sig. Case 1a: Rule subs refl. From the rule, Γ ⊢ 1 ≡ σ : sig. From Lemma E.14, σ is 1. Case 2a: Rule subs trans. From the rule, Γ ⊢ 1 ≤ σ ′ : sig and Γ ⊢ σ ′ ≤ σ : sig. Since Γ ⊢ 1 ≤ σ ′ : sig, from IH, σ ′ is 1. Since Γ ⊢ σ ′ ≤ σ : sig and σ ′ is 1, from IH, we have that σ is 1. We now prove the second part of the lemma by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≤ σ : sig. Case 1b: Rule subs refl. From the rule, Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≡ σ : sig. From Lemma E.14, σ is (|T|). Case 2b: Rule subs trans. From the rule, Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≤ σ ′ : sig and Γ ⊢ σ ′ ≤ σ : sig. Since Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≤ σ ′ : sig, from IH, σ ′ is (|T|). Since Γ ⊢ σ ′ ≤ σ : sig and σ ′ is (|T|), from IH, we have that σ is (|T|). Case 3b: Rule subs stat. From the rule, σ is k ′ s.t. Γ ⊢ T ≤ k ′ : kind. From Lemma E.15, k ′ = T.
Lemma E.17. For any L ⊆ V P , if Γ ⊢ L P ≤ σ : sig for some σ, then Γ ⊢ L P ≡ σ : sig.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on L.
We have that L P = 1. Therefore, we have that ⊢ 1 ≤ σ : sig. From Lemma E.16, we have that σ is 1. Thus, Γ ⊢ 1 ≡ σ : sig.
Case 2: L = x :: L ′ where x ∈ dom(F P ). We have that L P = Σα x : (|T|).Σα : |α x | . L ′ P . From the definition of subsignature, σ = Σα x : σ 1 .Σα : σ 2 .σ 3 . Without loss of generality, we suppose that α x and α are not in dom(Γ) (we can change the constructor variables if necessary). Therefore, we have that Γ, α x : T ok and Γ, α x : T, α : 1 ok.
Since Γ ⊢ L P ≤ σ : sig, from the subs sigma rule, it follows that:
• Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≤ σ 1 : sig • Γ, α x : T ⊢ Σα : |α x | . L ′ P ≤ Σα : σ 2 .σ 3 , and hence, -Γ, α x : T ⊢ |α x | ≤ σ 2 : sig -Γ, α x : T, α : 1 ⊢ L ′ P ≤ σ 3 : sig We have that:
• Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≤ σ 1 : sig. From Lemma E.16, σ 1 is (|T|) and hence, Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≡ σ 1 : sig.
• Γ, α x : T ⊢ |α x | ≤ σ 2 : sig. From Lemma E.12, Γ, α x : T ⊢ |α x | ≡ σ 2 : sig. Without loss of generality, we suppose that α f , α 1 , and α 2 are not in dom(Γ) (we can change the constructor variables if it is necessary). Therefore, we have that Γ, α f : T ok, Γ, α f : T, α 1 : 1 ok, and Γ, α f : T, α 1 : 1, α 2 : 1 ok.
Since Γ ⊢ L P ≤ σ : sig, from the subs sigma rule, it follows that: Lemma E.18. Let σ be a signature s.t. Γ ⊢ σ P ≡ σ : sig. It follows that Fst(σ) = Fst(σ P ).
Proof. We claim that for any L ⊆ V P and σ s.t. ⊢ L P ≡ σ : sig, it follows that Fst(σ) = Fst( L P ). The proof then follows directly from the claim. We prove the claim by induction on L.
We have that L P = 1. Since Γ ⊢ σ ≡ σ P : sig, from Lemma E.14, σ = 1. From the definition of Fst(), we have that Fst(σ) = Fst( L P ) = 1.
Case 2: L = x :: L ′ , where x ∈ dom(F P ). We have that L P = Σα x : (|T|).Σα : |α x | . L ′ P . Since ⊢ L P ≡ σ : sig, from the eqs sigma rule, σ is Σα x : σ 1 .Σα : σ 2 .σ 3 s.t.
• Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≡ σ 1 : sig • Γ, α x : T ⊢ Σα : |α x | . L ′ P ≡ Σα : σ 2 .σ 3 : sig.
-Γ, α x : T ⊢ |α x | ≡ σ 2 : sig -Γ, α x : T, α : 1 ⊢ L ′ P ≡ σ 3 : sig (notice that since α x : T, it follows that Fst( |τ | ) = 1). We have that:
• Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≡ σ 1 : sig. From Lemma E.14, σ 1 = |T| . Thus, Fst(σ 1 ) = T = Fst( |T| ).
• Γ, α x : T ⊢ |α x | ≡ σ 2 : sig. From Lemma E.11, σ 2 = |τ | for some τ s.t. Γ, α x : T ⊢ α x ≡ τ : T. Thus, • For any Γ, if Γ ⊢ |τ | ≡ σ : sig, then σ = |τ ′ | for some τ ′ s.t. Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T.
• Since ⊢ σ * ≤ σ : sig and ⊢ σ * ≡ σ P : sig, we have that ⊢ σ P ≤ σ : sig. From Lemma E.17, we have that ⊢ σ P ≡ σ : sig.
• Since α P : Fst(σ * ) ⊢ σ ′ ≤ |τ | : sig, from Lemma E.20, we have that σ ′ = |τ ′ | for some τ ′ .
Thus, we have that ⊢ P wrap P (e) : Π gn α P : σ. |τ ′ | s.t. ⊢ σ ≡ σ P : sig. From IH, we close this case.
Lemma E.22. If α P /m P : σ ⊢ I |e| : |τ | for some σ s.t. ⊢ σ ≡ σ P : sig, then α P /m P : σ ⊢ P |e| : |τ ′ | for some τ ′ s.t. α P /m P : σ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the derivation of α P /m P : σ ⊢ I |e| : |τ | . We only have the following case: Case 1: ofm forget. The proof is directly from the rule. Case 2: ofm subsume. From the rule, we have that α P /m P : σ ⊢ I |e| : σ ′ and α P /m P : σ ⊢ σ ′ ≤ |τ | : sig. From Lemma E.20, we have that σ ′ = |τ ′′ | s.t. α P /m P : σ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′′ : T. Thus, we can apply IH on α P /m P : σ ⊢ I |e| : σ ′ and close this case.
Lemma E.23. If α P /m P : σ ⊢ P |e| : |τ | for some σ s.t. ⊢ σ ≡ σ P : sig, then α P /m P : σ ⊢ e : τ ′ for some τ ′ s.t. α P /m P : σ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the derivation of α P /m P : σ ⊢ P |e| : |τ | . We have the following cases. Theorem D.14 [ §VII] If ⊢ P wrap P (e) : Π gn α P : σ P . |τ | , then e is TRNI(P, τ ).
Proof. From Lemma E.24, we have that α P /m P : σ ⊢ e : τ ′ for some σ and τ ′ s.t. ⊢ σ ≡ σ P : sig and α P /m P : σ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T. From Lemma E.18, we have that Fst(σ) = Fst(σ P ). In addition, since module variables are not used in the judgments Γ ⊢ c : k, we have that α P : Fst(σ P ) ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T. Thus, we have that α P /m P : σ P ⊢ e : τ . From Theorem VII.1, e is TRNI(P, τ ).
APPENDIX F REMARK AND ENCODING
a) Alternative definition for P.: An alternative way to define a local policy P is to define it as a total mapping from confidential inputs to declassification functions and combinations. One may think that w.r.t. this definition, we cannot express policies with inputs that cannot be declassified. In fact, we can expresses such policies: such a confidential input is mapped to λx : int.n 0 for some n 0 . The application of this function on a confidential value is always n 0 and hence this function does not reveal information about the confidential value. b) Extension.: We consider a policy P where there are two confidential inputs x and y, x can be declassified via f , and y can be declassified via g, f : int → τ , and g : int → τ for some τ . Suppose that there exists an action a s.t. f • a = g semantically. With the encoding in Section V, we accept g y, or rather x g y, but we cannot accept x f (x a y) even though it is semantically the same. To allow both, we have devised an encoding similar to the extension described above for policies with multiple declassifiers, where y is viewed as a confidential input that can be declassified via g or f • a.
To accept programs like x f (x a y), based on the idea of the first extension, we encode the policy as below, where y is viewed as a confidential input that can be declassified via g or f • a. Γ P C = x : int, x f : int → τ, y : int, y g : int → τ, y a : int → int ∆ P P = α f , α g,f •a Γ P P = x : α f , x f : α f → τ, y : α g,f •a , y g : α g,f •a → τ, x a : α g,f •a → α f Indistinguishability for this policy is defined similarly to the one in Section V, except that we have the following rule for α g,f •a .
EQ-VAR6
As in the first extension, we can define TRNI for a type τ well-formed in ∆ P P and we have the free theorem stating that if Γ P C ⊢ e, and ∆ P P , Γ P P ⊢ e : τ , then e is TRNI(P, τ ).
